It was stated earlier that I was interested in finding an objective analysis of the Iraq debacle and was led to George Packer's book-- "The Assassin's Gate". It proved to be a fine book, and as with all human endeavors had the author's imprint. Most of the book sounded convincing to me and I have every reason to believe it is essentially true. Paul Bremer, Bush's replacement for Jay Garner, the first American civilian Iraq Administrator, has written a book about his year in Iraq and apparently disputed some of Packer's comments as untrue. Then on the Tim Russert Show, when closely questioned about some disputed statments, brought out that he had privately held one view but publicly stated another. I'd hate to have everything I've said or done held up to public scrutiny so I can sympathize with Bremer. Nonetheless he has been given much criticism for his handling of his administration of Iraq. First I'd like to review Packer's book and then comment on things in general.
Book Review
Title: The Assassin’s Gate
Author: George Packer
The author is both tough-minded yet sufficiently sensitive to register all the complexities of the Iraqi debate. He is a chronicler and an intelligent guide. So says Christopher Hitchens on the book jacket.
What is generally lost in the “soundbite” type of reporting and the polemics that pass for discussion is the story of what the Iraqis have endured and are enduring. Here is where Packard excels.
The author has his own opinions and clearly states them but does not allow them to suppress nor exaggerate the conditions as he sees them. He welcomes the demise of Saddam but questions the wisdom of the war.
Packer was an up close witness to the prewar debates as well as the war’s carnage. He cuts past the simplistic recriminations and sets forth an objective analysis and commentary of the causes of the war, it’s ineptness at preventing chaos, the divisive nature of the tribal and religious factions in Iraq, and the cost in life and treasure on both sides.
There were key elements that occurred prior to the war that Packer learned from his contacts. Richard Haas, director of policy planning -- State Department, relates he became aware of more and more “bureaucratic chatter“. When he met was Condoleeza Rice on key foreign policy issues, the discussion on Iraq was cut short when he began to state the State Department’s misgivings about a war . “Save your breath” Rice interrupted. “The president has already made up his mind“. There was no weighing of pros and cons “the decision was not made -- it happened -- you can’t say when “.
One document written by Philip Zelikow, ,( instead of Richard Haas of the State Department),at C. Rice's request, a University of Virginia professor, contained a short eloquent statement of principles and a new passage on preemptive war. This was immediately taken as the justification for war with Iraq. The new Bush doctrine. This was a combination of Bush Sr.s realism and the neo-con’s idealism. An internationalism combining our values and national interests with the protection of peace by preempting threats to peace. In doing so we would, if possible, use a coalition of the willing or, if need be, go it alone.
Another important figure was Andrew Erdmann, an academic who wrote a Ph.D. thesis at Harvard. Haas had taught with Erdman’s adviser plus Erdmann's name was passed along by Paul Zelikow. Haas asked him to write a memo on postwar reconstruction. He applied the ideas of his dissertation to a series of case studies from two world wars through recent conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo.
Meanwhile at the Pentagon a new unit, Office of Special Plans was overseen by Douglas Fieth, Pentagon undersecretary for policy. Fieth, out of government for 20 years had been fired by Reagan’s national security adviser William Clark but then was brought to the Pentagon by Richard Pearle. These activities and writings were devoted to bolstering the hard-line policies of the Likud party. Fieth was a card-carrying Likud member, according to Packer.
“Special Plans” was an idea of Wolfowitz and goes back to 1976 when he advised the CIA and was more alarmist about the Soviets than the intelligence agencies. The operation was led by David Wurmser and F. Michael Maloof, who worked for Pearle under Reagan and the Defense Department. Wurmser collected raw data largely from defectors in the Iraqi National Congress (an exile group) in order to prove the assumption of Saddam’s ties to Al Qaeda and the likelihood he’d hand off W. M.D. to terrorists. Their job was to prove the assumptions with “found facts“.
In the eyes of the Pentagon civilians the intelligence agencies were held in very low esteem. A new method was to be used starting with the higher insights of political philosophy rather than evidence from the fallen world of social science.
It is interesting to follow the activities and functions of many of these individuals. Wurmser ended up in Cheney’s office. Maloof had his clearance revoked but his work wound up as bullet points in policy papers from Special Plans and piped to the White House directly by Luti and Schulsky (Fieth’s buddies). The vice president’s office was allied with the neo-cons through Scooter Libby and Rice’s national security director for the Middle East, Elliot Abrams.
In this fashion the intelligence gathering and its utilization occurred. Apparently general debate was avoided in which unwanted objections might contravene the foregone decisions.
Luti, a former navy captain, a Newt Gingrich aid and Cheney adviser, was a strong supporter of war with Iraq. Because Zinni, the former head of Central Command and Bush’s envoy to the Middle East expressed doubt about an Iraq war Anthony Luti, in conversation, called Zinni a traitor.
Packer ties several other scholars and experts on the Middle East together with the Iraqi National Congress. This group theorized about means for changing the complexion of the Middle East. Ahmad Chilabi was a leading figure in this group and the darling of the Pentagon and the CIA until he fell out of favor.
Troop strength, as suggested by a Marine major at the National Security Council, based on experience in Kosovo, was 500,000 to secure Iraq. State and Defense were at odds over every issue of the postwar period. Richard Haas of State cited failure on Rice’s part as the National Security Adviser. Instead of helping to reconcile the differences between State and Defense, and introduce arguments that deserved consideration, Rice proved more skillful at seconding the president than obliging him to consider a range of ideas and resolving them in a coherent manner.
All through the lead up to the war ideas or evidences contrary to the progression to war was effectively ignored. The avowed antipathy for “nation building” during the election campaign was unceremoniously dumped as plans progressed for “regime change“.
The Pentagon and Oval Office proved bulletproof against concerted opinions of a wide range of advisory agencies that agreed that security and reconstruction of postwar Iraq required large numbers of troops as well as international cooperation.
The expectations that the White House and Department of Defense, Rumsfeld, held were largely wishful thinking based on their own theoretical concepts and the misinformation given by the exile groups. The war was to be short (“shock and awe“) and the Armed Forces welcomed as liberators with the withdrawal of the forces in quick succession. “Mission accomplished”. All caveats and cautionary notions were simply dismissed.
I’m curious about the author’s ability to quote Oval Office conversations. Is he a mouse in the woodwork,?. I assume he is quoting persons present.
Please read “ The Assassins Gate” because it contains much detail regarding the people involved and gives nuances I’m too impatient to put down here.
Book Review
Title: The Assassin’s Gate
Author: George Packer
The author is both tough-minded yet sufficiently sensitive to register all the complexities of the Iraqi debate. He is a chronicler and an intelligent guide. So says Christopher Hitchens on the book jacket.
What is generally lost in the “soundbite” type of reporting and the polemics that pass for discussion is the story of what the Iraqis have endured and are enduring. Here is where Packard excels.
The author has his own opinions and clearly states them but does not allow them to suppress nor exaggerate the conditions as he sees them. He welcomes the demise of Saddam but questions the wisdom of the war.
Packer was an up close witness to the prewar debates as well as the war’s carnage. He cuts past the simplistic recriminations and sets forth an objective analysis and commentary of the causes of the war, it’s ineptness at preventing chaos, the divisive nature of the tribal and religious factions in Iraq, and the cost in life and treasure on both sides.
There were key elements that occurred prior to the war that Packer learned from his contacts. Richard Haas, director of policy planning -- State Department, relates he became aware of more and more “bureaucratic chatter“. When he met was Condoleeza Rice on key foreign policy issues, the discussion on Iraq was cut short when he began to state the State Department’s misgivings about a war . “Save your breath” Rice interrupted. “The president has already made up his mind“. There was no weighing of pros and cons “the decision was not made -- it happened -- you can’t say when “.
One document written by Philip Zelikow, ,( instead of Richard Haas of the State Department),at C. Rice's request, a University of Virginia professor, contained a short eloquent statement of principles and a new passage on preemptive war. This was immediately taken as the justification for war with Iraq. The new Bush doctrine. This was a combination of Bush Sr.s realism and the neo-con’s idealism. An internationalism combining our values and national interests with the protection of peace by preempting threats to peace. In doing so we would, if possible, use a coalition of the willing or, if need be, go it alone.
Another important figure was Andrew Erdmann, an academic who wrote a Ph.D. thesis at Harvard. Haas had taught with Erdman’s adviser plus Erdmann's name was passed along by Paul Zelikow. Haas asked him to write a memo on postwar reconstruction. He applied the ideas of his dissertation to a series of case studies from two world wars through recent conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo.
Meanwhile at the Pentagon a new unit, Office of Special Plans was overseen by Douglas Fieth, Pentagon undersecretary for policy. Fieth, out of government for 20 years had been fired by Reagan’s national security adviser William Clark but then was brought to the Pentagon by Richard Pearle. These activities and writings were devoted to bolstering the hard-line policies of the Likud party. Fieth was a card-carrying Likud member, according to Packer.
“Special Plans” was an idea of Wolfowitz and goes back to 1976 when he advised the CIA and was more alarmist about the Soviets than the intelligence agencies. The operation was led by David Wurmser and F. Michael Maloof, who worked for Pearle under Reagan and the Defense Department. Wurmser collected raw data largely from defectors in the Iraqi National Congress (an exile group) in order to prove the assumption of Saddam’s ties to Al Qaeda and the likelihood he’d hand off W. M.D. to terrorists. Their job was to prove the assumptions with “found facts“.
In the eyes of the Pentagon civilians the intelligence agencies were held in very low esteem. A new method was to be used starting with the higher insights of political philosophy rather than evidence from the fallen world of social science.
It is interesting to follow the activities and functions of many of these individuals. Wurmser ended up in Cheney’s office. Maloof had his clearance revoked but his work wound up as bullet points in policy papers from Special Plans and piped to the White House directly by Luti and Schulsky (Fieth’s buddies). The vice president’s office was allied with the neo-cons through Scooter Libby and Rice’s national security director for the Middle East, Elliot Abrams.
In this fashion the intelligence gathering and its utilization occurred. Apparently general debate was avoided in which unwanted objections might contravene the foregone decisions.
Luti, a former navy captain, a Newt Gingrich aid and Cheney adviser, was a strong supporter of war with Iraq. Because Zinni, the former head of Central Command and Bush’s envoy to the Middle East expressed doubt about an Iraq war Anthony Luti, in conversation, called Zinni a traitor.
Packer ties several other scholars and experts on the Middle East together with the Iraqi National Congress. This group theorized about means for changing the complexion of the Middle East. Ahmad Chilabi was a leading figure in this group and the darling of the Pentagon and the CIA until he fell out of favor.
Troop strength, as suggested by a Marine major at the National Security Council, based on experience in Kosovo, was 500,000 to secure Iraq. State and Defense were at odds over every issue of the postwar period. Richard Haas of State cited failure on Rice’s part as the National Security Adviser. Instead of helping to reconcile the differences between State and Defense, and introduce arguments that deserved consideration, Rice proved more skillful at seconding the president than obliging him to consider a range of ideas and resolving them in a coherent manner.
All through the lead up to the war ideas or evidences contrary to the progression to war was effectively ignored. The avowed antipathy for “nation building” during the election campaign was unceremoniously dumped as plans progressed for “regime change“.
The Pentagon and Oval Office proved bulletproof against concerted opinions of a wide range of advisory agencies that agreed that security and reconstruction of postwar Iraq required large numbers of troops as well as international cooperation.
The expectations that the White House and Department of Defense, Rumsfeld, held were largely wishful thinking based on their own theoretical concepts and the misinformation given by the exile groups. The war was to be short (“shock and awe“) and the Armed Forces welcomed as liberators with the withdrawal of the forces in quick succession. “Mission accomplished”. All caveats and cautionary notions were simply dismissed.
I’m curious about the author’s ability to quote Oval Office conversations. Is he a mouse in the woodwork,?. I assume he is quoting persons present.
Please read “ The Assassins Gate” because it contains much detail regarding the people involved and gives nuances I’m too impatient to put down here.
posted by Don.B. | 2:40 PM
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